The Union victories in the First
and Sixth Congressional Districts, at
the special election in June, 1861,
although the majorities were meagre,
were of great importance by
demonstrating that even in the
slaveholding territory of the State
the unionists were at least as
numerous as the opposition. It will
probably be contended by
non-unionists, that the election was
held at a period when military
interference affected the result, but
such a contention is without
justification. Speaking particularly
of the Sixth District, I am confident
that a fairer election was never held
within its borders. I assert this
.from personal observation. The votes
of Southern sympathizers and
secessionists were nowhere challenged
in the district and they were cast
solidly for Benjamin G. Harris, of St.
Mary's county, Mr. Calvert's opponent.
Mr. Harris was a pronounced
secessionist, while Mr. Calvert was as
emphatic in support of the Government.
To make this clear I will relate a
little story of personal experience
bearing upon the subject. My name had
been prominently mentioned in
connection with the nomination. I did
not desire to be a candidate but was
determined that, if it could possibly
be prevented, the nomination should
not be given to any aspirant who was
not in full accord with the Government
and in favor of prosecuting the war
for the preservation of the Union. The
nominating convention met at
Bladensburg, but only four of the
seven counties in the district were
represented. These were Montgomery,
Howard, Anne Arunelel and Prince
George's. Calvert, Charles and St.
Mary's which were strongly Southern in
sympathy, sent no delegates. Each of
the four counties represented placed a
different name in nomination. op the
first ballot Montgomery county cast
three votes for Alien Bowie Davis,
Howard county three for Judge Edward
Hammond, Prince Georges four for
Charles B. Calvert. I received the
four votes of Anne Arundel county.
Then the Prince George's delegates
approached me and proffered me their
support on the second ballot. That
meant, my nomination, if I had
concluded to accept it; but as I did
not desire it, the proposition gave me
the opportunity to confer with Mr.
Calvert's supporters and to gain a
clear understanding of his views and
his purposes in regard to sustaining
the government, if nominated and
elected. I informed the delegation
that I favored his nomination,
provided he would come before the
convention and promise that. if
elected, he would vote for men and
money to prosecute the war for the
preservation of the Union. Before the
second ballot was taken he appeared
in the convention and gave an
emphatic pledge to pursue that course.
"I am," he said, "in favor of
preserving the Union, peaceably if we
can, forcibly if we must, and, if
elected to Congress, I will vote for
measures necessary to that end: and
that means for men and money to carry
on the war to a successful
termination." By my advice the Anne
Arundel delegation voted for him on
the second ballot and he was declared
the nominee of the convention. He was
an honorable man and fully redeemed
his promise by his votes in Congress.
The unprejudiced reader will
readily agree that in the slaveholding
territory there was a larger
proportion of prominent citizens in
sympathy with the Southern cause than
in other sections of the State. This
was perfectly natural, as the
secession movement was a slaveholders'
revolt against the freesoilism of the
Republican party, and most of the
leading men in the locality were slave
owners. This meant, of course, that
victory for Mr. Calvert could only
have been achieved by the rank and
file of the voters, and is
corroborative of the contention that a
majority of the working people were in
favor of the Union and of the national
administration then endeavoring to
preserve it by military power. Further
on I will relate another circumstance
in confirmation of this contention,
the story being so interwoven with
other events that it would mar it to
disconnect it from them.
It may seem superfluous to repeat a
statement already made, but I desire
to emphasize the fact that the special
election in June, 1861, was as free
and fair as it could have been under
the most favorable conditions. Up to
that time there had been no repression
of the freedom of speech in Maryland,
and Southern sympathizers were
permitted to express their sentiments
freely and without restraint. In
Annapolis a body of these
sympathizers, numbering 75 or 80, had
banded together and nightly paraded
the streets, halting at intervals and
cheering for Jeff Davis and the
Southern Confederacy. Their movements
were such as indicated that they were
being drilled as a military
organization. But for sometime after
the war began they were not restrained
in action by the Federal authorities.
On one occasion, while a company of
unionists was holding a meeting in the
City Hall, on Main street, for the
purpose of perfecting an organization
to guard the city and preserve order,
this body of secessionists marched to
a point on the street opposite the
hall, and stood for some time shouting
lustily for their Southern favorite.
The unionists were with difficulty
restrained by their leaders from
rushing from the hall and attacking
their bold opponents. The situation
was becoming very tense, when finally,
about the middle of the summer of
1861, the commandant of the Provost
guard, whose headquarters were at the
Naval Academy, notified the leaders of
the secession gang that their open
demonstration of hostility to the
government must cease, and this put an
end to the trouble. The fact is
mentioned here to show the extreme
leniency exercised by the military
authorities toward those who made an
open display of their hostility to the
Union, long after the war for its
preservation was in progress, and to
furnish additional evidence of the
perfect fairness of the election which
had resulted in favor of the Union
cause.
And just here let me call attention
to the election of State officers in
November 1861, which had a similar
result throughout the State generally.
Augustus W. Bradford, of Baltimore
county, was the Union candidate for
governor, and Samuel S. Maffit, of
Cecil county, the candidate for
comptroller of the treasury. Benjamin
C. Howard, a Past Grand Master of the
Masonic Grand Lodge of. the State, an
eminent citizen and a member of the
Howard family, distinguished for its
services in the Revolutionary War, and
later, was the secession candidate.
Mr. Howard was a Southern sympathizer
and opposed to the war, but not a
secessionist per se. His rather
conservative views, however, did not
save him from an overwhelming defeat.
Mr. Bradford was elected governor by
an immense majority, the total vote
having been as follows:
- Bradford - 57,503
- Howard - 26,965
- Bradford's majority - 30,538
The border counties, Allegany,
Washington, Frederick, Carroll,
Baltimore, Harford and Cecil gave
14,474 of this majority. The only
counties which gave majorities for
Howard were Calvert, Charles, St.
Mary's and Talbott, but in most of the
other counties of the slaveholding
section the vote was close. The number
of votes polled in the counties was
about equal to the number usually cast
at State elections, hut for some
reason which I cannot undertake to
explain, the secessionists in
Baltimore, in many cases, failed to
vote and, while Bradford received
17,922, only 3,347 voted for Howard.
It should not be inferred from what
I have said about the tendency of
slaveholders to favor the Confederate
cause, that all of them were of that
mind. There were many notable
exceptions to this rule and many true
unionists among this class of
citizens; men who believed that the
preservation of the Union was
paramount to every personal interest.
There were no truer loyalists in this
country and they deserve to be honored
for their patriotism and their
devotion to principle against what
they had reason to believe was their
personal interest, and the defeat of
which would have resulted in the loss
of their property in slaves. All of
these, however, who in the earlier
stages of the war had been unionists,
did not remain true to the cause to
the end of the struggle. They were
alienated by the Emancipation
Proclamation issued by President
Lincoln and by an early movement in
the State for the emancipation of the
slaves within her borders, without
compensation to loyal owners, which
finally culminated in that result by
the adoption of the constitution of
1864.
The effect of this was that when
Mr. Calvert was a candidate for
re-election in 1863, he was beaten.
Benjamin G. Harris was again the
opposing, and this time, the
successful candidate. He was, however,
the only secessionist elected to
Congress from Maryland during the war,
and he narrowly escaped expulsion for
open expressions of sympathy for the
South in its efforts to establish a
separate government. Speaking in
opposition to a resolution for the
expulsion of Alexander Long, of the
Second District of Ohio, who had
expressed himself in favor of
recognizing the independence of the
Southern Confederacy, Mr. Harris said:
'The South ask you to leave them in
peace, but now you say you will bring
them into subjection. This is. not
done yet, and God Almighty grant it
never may be."
For this language a resolution to
expel Mm from the House was
introduced, but it was found that in
neither his case nor that of Mr. Long,
could the necessary two-thirds vote to
adopt the resolution be obtained.
Resolutions of censure, however, were
passed and Mr. Harris was publicly
reprimanded by the Speaker for his
disloyal utterance. His course did not
show the "bent" of Maryland, unless
that of Mr. Long displayed the
inclination of Ohio, as Harris's was
the only disloyal exhibition in the
House by a Maryland member, during the
war. It is to be remarked also that as
the district from which Mr. Harris was
elected, lay contiguous to the
District of Columbia and adjacent to
the National Capital, the election of
so arrant a secessionist as he, is at
least prima facie evidence that his
supporters were not over awed by
threats of force or military
interference with their right to cast
the ballot.
It would be folly, as I have
already said in substance, to deny
that there was a wide division of
sentiment among the people of the
State upon the question of secession,
but my contention and I believe its
correctness is borne out by what I
have already stated is that the
friends of the Union were in a decided
majority. Many other facts and
incidents can and will be cited which
will not only strengthen but fully
demonstrate the truth of this
assertion, the evidence to that effect
being cumulative. Practically the
people were divided into several
distinct classes with varying shades
of opinion as to the best course to be
pursued in the emergency. These
classes might be reduced to about
there unconditional unionists, who
favored an immediate resort to force;
conservative unionists, who reprecated
disunion and were opposed to
secession, but hoped against hope and
believed it possible to restore the
Union by compromise; and those who
were out and out in favor of secession
and union with the new Confederacy.
Strange as it may seem, some of those
included in the second class claimed
that by seceding Maryland would place
herself in a position to act as a
mediator between the Government and
the seceding States and thus, by
courting assurances of
non-intervention with the peculiar
institution of the South on one side,
and reasonable concessions on the
other, bring about the reunion which
they fully desired. In this connection
I have in mind a letter received from
a friend in January, 1861, a prominent
citizen of Frederick, a member of the
bar and afterwards for thirty years a
judge of the Circuit Court. In this
letter my friend importuned me to use
whatever influence I might possess
with Governor Hicks to induce him to
convene the legislature in extra
session that it might call a
convention to place Maryland in this
attitude of mediation. I need hardly
say that the scheme did not commend
itself to my judgment and in replying
to the letter I gave my friend to
understand very distinctly, that I did
not believe in the efficiency of his
remedy to prevent the disruption of
the Union. I further informed him that
I was urging the governor to resist
all appeals to him to call an extra
session of the legislature. I feared
this friend, from whom in previous
years I had learned devotion to the
Union, was drifting away from his
moorings upon the tide of secession,
and his subsequent course confirmed
that apprehension.
Others of this class wanted the
State to take some action without
knowing exactly what it should be.
They were, figuratively speaking, at
sea, and drifting, without definite
knowledge of their whereabouts. But in
the early days of the secession
movement they joined the pronounced
secessionists, like my optimistic
Frederick friend, in importuning the
governor to call an extra session of
the legislature. Like him, also, they
became, in the end, out and out
secessionists and bitterly hostile to
the government during the war. From
them and from the open secessionists,
who were not very numerous, the
governor received innumerable letters
and direct personal appeals urging him
to call the legislature together. But
most of the real conservative
unionists became decided supporters of
the government in its efforts to
suppress the rebellion after all
compromise projects had failed. It is
possible that if the governor had
yielded to the importunities of the
secessionists and their conservative
union allies in their demands for an
extra session of the legislature, an
ordinance of secession would have been
adopted, but that it would have been
by less than a real majority of the
voters of the State. I am convinced
that at no time could such an
ordinance have received a clear
majority of the entire voting
population of the State. The danger
lay, in that case, in the active aid
the secessionists would have received
from the Confederacy, and in the
probability that coercion by force
would have been employed to deter the
unionists from asserting their rights
at the polls. The temper of those who
were intent on "joining the new
Confederacy" was of a character to
have made such action more than
possible, if the opportunity had been
given them. Occasionally threats were
made that unless the governor gave
them the opportunity to ally Maryland
with the South they would take the
matter into their own hands, call a
convention by proclamation and vote
the State out of the Union. An eminent
Maryland lawyer had once declared that
it was possible for the people of the
commonwealth lo assemble in mass and
change the constitution, and that such
action, carried into successful
effect, would be valid. But Governor
Hicks was not alarmed by such threats.
He did not believe the malcontents
would carry their efforts to the
extent of making such an attempt, and
was confident that if it were made it
would result in failure. He continued
his inaction through the winter,
though at times leading the
secessionists to believe that he was
considering their demands and might in
due time concede them. It has been
charged that he was really vacillating
in that respect, but. I know that any
word of his that gave color to the
charge was spoken for the purpose of
quieting the unrest that <was being
manifested by the Southern
sympathizers, and of rendering action
toward the secession of the State
impossible until it should have become
too late to have made such an effort
successful. The late Severn Teackle
Wallis, one of the most eminent
lawyers and pronounced secessionists
in the State, accused the governor
with duplicity. Mr. Wallis, who was a
leading member of the Baltimore bar,
used this word in its most offensive
sense, in which it was, in my
judgment, very unjust. It would be
about as fair to charge the commander
of an army with duplicity for making a
military movement for the purpose of
deceiving his enemy as to his real
intentions. Governor Hicks doubtless
felt and expressed sympathy for the
South in a limited sense. He was a
slaveholder, was born and reared and
had lived all his life in the
atmosphere of slavery. He would, at
the time Mr. Wallis made the charge
against him, have been bitterly
opposed to interference on the part of
the government with that institution
where it existed. He did not pretend
to be in sympathy with abolition.
There was no doubleness about him in
that respect. If the secessionists
were deceived by his utterances
against such interference into
believing that he was only waiting ,a
favorable moment to join them in
carrying the State out of the Union,
they simply jumped at a conclusion of
which the "wish was father to the
thought." Governor Hicks was, it must
be acknowledged, artful and diplomatic
in political affairs, but not
double-minded or unstable. Those who
were brought into intimate relations
with him knew that he never disclosed
his plans and purposes to a political
enemy. Many stories are told of this
characteristic of his mind, as it was
exhibited in his political career in
his own county, which he represented
in the State Senate as a Whig, many
years before the Civil War, and in
which he was never defeated: for
office, though frequently a candidate.
But it is not my purpose to relate any
of these stories here, and they are
only alluded to give emphasis to the
real meaning of the object I have
attributed to 'him in his dealing with
the secessionists. He wished to avoid
an open outbreak and a conflict that
might have plunged the State into a
civil war on its own account. Any
independent movement of the
secessionists to have allied the State
with the new Confederacy would have
been resisted by the unionists and
bloodshed would undoubtedly have
followed.
The antagonistic relations between
unionists and secessionists grew very
bitter as the time for a change of the
National Administration approached,
and individual broils between them
were not infrequent. The
secessionists, too, beginning to
realize that they had been duped by
the governor, grew very bitter against
him and denounced him in unmeasured
terms.
Wrangles between citizens of
opposing sentiments occurred
occasionally, until about midsummer of
1861, but by that time the people had
learned that quarrels were to no
profit and that it was better policy
to live peaceably together than to be
engaged in wordy strife. It is
,probably a remarkable fact that from
that time throughout the war there was
little personal animosity among
citizens of Annapolis growing out of
the conflict. As its fortunes varied
there was rejoicing or sorrow
according to the success or defeat of
the side preferred, but taunts of the
defeated were rarely indulged in. Of
course there were exceptions to this
rule, but they were neither numerous
nor excessively offensive.
But to return to the consideration
of the course and character of
Governor Hicks. It is to be said that
he was not an ordinary man and cannot
be fairly judged by an ordinary man's
standard. He was humbly born and a man
of the people, though descended from
an excellent family. He had only the
education afforded by the inefficient
public schools of his early youth; but
he rose to distinction and performed
services for his state and country of
value far exceeding the appreciation
they have yet received.
The urgency with which the
secessionists made their pleas for a,
special session of the legislature
would have been embarrassing to the
governor if they had not been met with
as decided opposition from the
unionists, though I believe he would
in any case have withstood all efforts
to induce such action. He would have
found some excuse for postponing a
call and for baffling them. But he was
not without the moral support of a
large number of prominent citizens in
every section of the State, in
delaying action. Many of them by
letter and others in person exhorted
him to stand firm against the purposes
of those who were seeking to dragoon
the State into joining the Southern
Confederacy.
It was a significant circumstance
and strongly corroborative of the
testimony I am able to bear to his
loyalty, that .he sought the counsel
and advice, almost daily, of a few of
the most pronounced unionists in
Annapolis', but only conferred with
secessionists when they requested it.
William H. Purnell, comptroller of the
treasury, and I, having been elected
on the ticket with him in 1857, were
regarded by him as in some measure
members of his official family, and as
both were unconditional unionists he
kept us informed of the movements of
the opposition and consulted with us
concerning the best means of dealing
with and thwarting their efforts to
bring about the secession of the
State. Others with whom he most
frequently conferred were Hon.
Alexander Randall, an ex-member of
Congress and one of the most
consistent and ardent unionists in the
State; Judge Nicholas Brewer, who was,
if that were possible, a more radical
unionist than the former, and Judge
Brice W. Goldsborough, of the Court of
Appeals, grandfather of the present
governor Phillips L. Goldsborough. By
the information gained from the
governor, embodied especially in the
vast number of letters received by
him, pro and con, of the secession
movement, we were enabled to gauge the
drift of public sentiment which, I can
affirm confidently, was more favorable
to the Union than to the Southern
cause.
Governor Hicks' course in dealing
with Judge Handy, who was sent to
Annapolis as a commissioner from the
State of Mississippi, in the latter
part of January, 1861, to induce the
governor to take such action as would
place Maryland in line with her sister
States in the South, furnished one of
the strongest proofs of his
unqualified unionism. Judge Handy was
a native of Somerset county, Md., and
an old acquaintance of the governor.
He was a refined and pleasant
gentleman and well fitted for the
purpose of his mission, and it is
probable that his presence at
Annapolis caused the State Executive
more embarrassment than any other of
the many methods pursued by the
secessionists to win him to their
cause and induce him to turn the State
over to the action of the legislature.
Judge Handy would not rest content
with indefinite promises, contingent
upon uncertain occurrences, and daily
during the several weeks of his
presence in Annapolis, continued to
urge prompt action. The governor
played his non-committal game, as
skillfully as possible, while Judge
Handy fairly haunted the executive
chamber and, as time passed, redoubled
his importunities. At last, with
patience exhausted, he demanded an
explicit answer to a categorical
question:
"Governor, do you intend to call
the legislature in extra session?"
Driven to the wall, the governor,
no longer able to temporize with the
Mississippi Commissioner, replied, in
substance, "No; at least not at
present, and perhaps not at all."
Then Judge Handy rose in wrath and
exclaimed: "Well, sir, we will show
you that cotton is king."
I was not present at this
interview, but was promptly informed
of its purport and told of the
governor's tart reply to Judge Handy's
exclamation. I hesitate to repeat it,
as it was more expressive than polite,
but for the truth of history here it
is:
"Well, sir, you and your king
can go to hell together, we are not
going with you."
Governor Hicks' abhorrence of
secession had overcome his natural
inclination and lifelong habit of
treating all men with civility, and
his reply must have been a revelation
to the commissioner. It practically
took the governor into the open and
brought down upon him the anathemas of
the secessionists, while Judge Handy
returned to his home in Mississippi,
convinced that the Confederacy need
not look to the executive of Maryland
for assistance in its efforts to
embrace the entire South in its
government.
The mission of Judge Handy to
Annapolis had been, without doubt, a
cause of encouragement to those who
were importuning the governor to call
an extra session of the legislature,
but though discouraged by its failure
they did not abandon their efforts to
bring about that result. They knew
that the executives of Maryland and
Virginia were in correspondence and it
was generally understood that an
agreement existed between them to act
in concert. No doubt this was
partially correct, and the fact
encouraged the secessionists to
believe that both States would adopt
measures to join them to the
Confederacy. But Hicks' understanding
of his co-operation with Governor
Lecher, of Virginia, was that they
were to act in the interest of the
Union. He assured me at least, that
was his purpose in carrying on the
correspondence. Governor Lecher was
professing attachment to the Union
cause and Governor Hicks was fully
convinced of his sincerity and his
loyalty. His confidence may have been
misplaced, but the Governor of
Virginia must be credited with having
had, up to a certain period, a sincere
desire to prevent the secession of
that State, and be probably hoped and
believed, that, with Maryland's
cooperation, some basis of compromise
between the government and the
seceding States might be agreed upon
and the latter restored to their
fealty to the Union. That is not
entirely conjecture. It was the tone
of the correspondence and of Governor
Hicks's understanding of the matter.
But eventually Governor Lecher
yielded to the pressure brought to
bear upon him by the secessionists of
Virginia and the South. The
legislature of the State was convened,
passed a bill calling a convention,
provided for au election of delegates
and then submitted the State to the
action of the electors. That Virginia
was not prepared for secession even
then, was shown by the result of the
election. The unionists were
successful in electing a majority of
the delegates and there remained a
prospect that the convention might
refuse to submit an ordinance of
secession to a vote of the people. But
in the progress of events enough,
unionists were won over to secure the
passage of the ordinance. Numbers of
the delegates in favor of the Union
remained firm and resolute to the end,
but were treated with contempt and
obloquy, especially by the women of
Richmond. One of these Union delegates
informed me that he and others, who
had voted against the ordinance, were
so at upon by prominent ladies of the
city, as they passed out of the State
House after casting their votes
against secession. The secession of
the State inevitably followed. A
majority of the votes cast at the
election was in favor of the
ordinance, but it is still open to
doubt to say the least of it, whether
a majority of the people of the old
commonwealth would have voted that way
if the election had been full, free
and fair. The military power of the
Confederacy was practically in control
when the election was hold: the
unionists were overawed and the union
sentiment stifled. Even if the
contrary be admitted, I know there was
never a moment when Maryland's
governor was willing that she should
follow Virginia into secession,
notwithstanding there were times when
his words and his deeds seemed to
justify a different opinion, or to
indicate that he was, at least,
opposed to the employment of force to
prevent the success of the secession
movement. And it is but truth to say
that the employment of the military
power of the government for the
preservation of the Union was regarded
by Governor Hicks as the last resort
and only justified when all efforts at
conciliation had failed. And that was
the general sentiment of the unionists
of Maryland, as well as of many
friends of the Union in the Northern
States. When all other reasonable
means to prevent the disruption of the
nation had been tried and failed, the
governor was as decidedly in favor of
prosecuting the war as was Lincoln
himself.
But to return again to the
consideration of the acts on his part
which then gave color to the charge
that he was of doubtful loyalty, and
which are still believed by many to
have been prompted by a sneaking
sympathy with the cause of the
Southern Confederacy.
The Old
Executive Manson (No Longer
Standing) & The State House 1861 |
Of these acts there stand out
prominently a speech which he
delivered in Monument Square,
Baltimore, on the night of April 19,
1861, after the attack of the mob on
the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment; his
protest to General Benjamin F. Butler
against landing troops from another
State at the United States Naval
Academy, and his proclamation
convening the legislature in extra
session at Frederick, far away from
the State Capital. All these acts were
crowded into three or four days, on
and immediately succeeding the date of
the uprising of the mob in Baltimore
the memorable 19th of April, 1861,
against the passage of Northern troops
through that city and it’s attack on
the Massachusetts men on their march
over Pratt street.
The governor was in Baltimore when
the riot began and, at the earnest
solicitation of friends and ni3mbers
of the city government, remained until
the following morning. It is charged
that at a conference of city officials
and prominent private citizens with
him he either gave orders to have the
bridges on the P. W. and B. Railroad
burned, or gave his assent to that
act, which was one of the incidents
connected with the effort to obstruct
the passage of Northern troops through
Maryland to the national Capital. This
he always strenuously denied. He was
under duress at the time and his life
was endangered. A lawless mob had
followed him on the street threatening
violence and crying ''Hang him, Hang
him." It is probable that, under the
circumstances, he may have said
something that was construed as an
assent to the destruction of the
bridges, but he always contended that
he had used no language that could
have been justly thus construed. In
his speech in Monument Square ha did,
however, declare that lie would
"rather lose his right arm than raise
it to strike down a sister State." It
will be seen that this language is
somewhat ambiguous, but was, at the
tune, construed as against the
employment .of force by the National
Government to defeat secession.
The governor returned to Annapolis
the fallowing morning, but the report
of his speech had preceded him. It
depressed the unionists and elated the
secessionists, who felt that at last
he was on their side in the great
controversy. He went from the train,
by which he arrived, to the State
House alone and it was my good fortune
to meat him on the steps at the front
entrance. I do not remember certainly
whether this was by accident or design
on my part. I was anxious to see him
and believe that, in anticipation of
his arrival, was on my way to the
executive chamber. As we met be
extended his hand and greeted me with
his usual cordiality. But I was in no
mood for the ordinary civilities and
at once, after shaking hands with him,
impulsively exclaimed:
"Well, Governor, you have
deserted us at last." The
exclamation was really meant as an
interrogatory, and his reply was a
question."
"What do you mean?"
"I mean that it is reported that
you made a secession speech in
Monument Square last night."
"That is not true," he replied. "I
did say some things that under other
circumstances I would have left
unsaid. The city was in the grip of
the rioters with whom the authorities
seemed unable to cope and the mob
spirit was rampant. My life was
threatened and I felt it was in great
danger. I believed that in order to
preserve it, it was necessary to
simulate sentiments which I dad not
and do not entertain." Then suddenly
changing his tone and manner to great
earnestness, he said:
"See here, I want you to know and
to be thoroughly convinced that I am
with you and will not desert you. The
Union must be preserved, and under no
circumstances will I abandon the
cause. Whatever shall occur you can
count on my standing by you."
I repeat this conversation from
memory and may not give the exact
language used by the governor, but
what tie said was quite as emphatic
and differed from it but little as I
have quoted it. His whole manner was
indicative of the most perfect
sincerity and his words lifted a great
load from my heart. I had feared that
he had been swept from his moorings
and was at last launched on the tide
of secession, or at least had given up
hope that the state could be kept from
joining in the secession movement; and
to learn from his own lips, with all
the emphasis that he could put into
the words', that my apprehensions were
unfounded, was a most cheering
assurance.
And here let me remind the reader
that this assurance was given at the
time when, under the impulse of the
mob spirit, there seemed danger that
the State might be carried out of the
Union in a whirlwind of excitement.
The mob of Southern sympathizers was
in supreme control in Baltimore, ,or
at least seemed to be so, and every
secessionist in the State was taking
heart and looking for speedy action in
the interest of the Southern cause.
But the governor, in this interview
with me, did not hesitate to assert
his continued and unchangeable
fidelity to the Union. There was no
hint of disloyalty in manner or speech
then; yet within thirty hours
thereafter he protested to Gen. Butler
against the lauding of Federal troops
at Annapolis.
Before proceeding to consider that
protest, the correspondence with
General Butler that followed it and
the latter's story of his arrival in
Maryland, with his comments on his
reception by the governor and the
mayor of Annapolis, which I wish to do
at some length, I desire to relate an
incident which, I believe, gave me the
opportunity to perform a service of
great value to the State and country.
That service was the prevention of the
governor's return to Baltimore on the
day succeeding the attack by the mob
on the Massachusetts troops.
After his interview with me, which
I have described, he went to the
executive chamber for a short time and
then to the governor's mansion for a
much needed rest. It did not occur to
me that he would be exposed to any
danger there, but about noon, Mr.
Purnell, the comptroller of the
treasury, with whom I was in constant
co-operation in our relations with the
governor, suggested that he should not
be left alone. That it was a time of
great peril and that he should be
guarded against the possibility of
danger. Rumors were in circulation
that the Baltimore mob was preparing
to descend upon the United States
Naval Academy, and as the executive
mansion was located on grounds
abutting on the harbor, just outside
of the academy walls, it was not
certain that the governor's person was
not in danger. As Mr. Purnell was busy
with his official duties I adopted his
suggestion and acted upon it. I went
to the executive mansion soon after
midday and spent the afternoon with
the governor. It has always been a
source of gratification to me that I
(M so, as my presence prevented his
return to Baltimore, where his life
would have been in great peril.
I had been with him but a short
time when a visitor was announced and
was shown into the room where we were
sitting. He was a tall, spare man of
middle age, sharp-featured and alert
in his movements. He promptly
introduced himself as Col Harrison,
and without further preliminary said:
"Governor, I have come down with a
special train to take you back to
Baltimore. You are needed there. The
city is in the hands of the mob and
the authorities are unable to cope
with the rioters. It is felt. that
your presence there will inspire the
law-abiding citizens with confidence,
as by your authority they can be
organized and officered and so be
placed in a position to quell the
riot," It was a strong appeal to the
governor's sense of duty, and there is
no manner of doubt that, but for my
presence, he would have yielded and
accompanied Col. Harrison back to
Baltimore.
I realized the impropriety and
danger of such a step and promptly
advised against it. I reminded the
governor that he was not then fully
recovered from the effects of a
surgical operation; that his health
was by no means robust; that he had
been under a great strain the previous
day and night and that he might
imperil his life by a repetition of
that experience. I did not allude to
the danger he might encounter from the
mob, nor suggest that others than the
rioters might be interested in his
vacating the gubernatorial office to
give place to an avowed secessionist
in the person of John B. Brooke, the
president of the State Senate. I
feared that any suggestion of that
character might prompt him to brave
the danger involved in his return to
the city. I urged the importance of
his life to the Union cause,
and the disastrous consequences
which would befall the cause by a
change in the executive office at that
time. He made no attempt to conceal
from Col. Harrison his devotion to the
Union and his sympathy with the
Federal Government in its purpose and
efforts to enforce the national laws
and re-posses the forts and other
property of the United States that had
been seized by the Confederacy. He did
not personally know Col. Harrison and,
of course, was ignorant of his
sentiments on the subject, but did not
attempt to .conceal his own loyalty.
Col. Harrison was furious at my
interference with Ms plans and we had
some hot words over the matter, but I
succeeded in dissuading the governor
from going back to Baltimore with him.
I remained at the executive mansion
until informed that Col. Harrison had
left Annapolis with his special train.
It is an ominous circumstance that
I have never been able to find a
prominent citizen of Baltimore who
knew this Col. Harrison. There was a
Col. Harrison in Baltimore at the
time, but he was an elderly man and a
prominent official of the Canton
Company, and I knew him personally.
There is no positive proof that the
governor's visitor cams to Annapolis
under an assumed name; but during his
interview he carefully refrained from
the expression of any political
sentiment, or of sympathy with the
friends of the Union; did not mention
the name of a single individual of
those who had sent him on his mission,
and left no address at which he could
have been communicated with if the
governor had desired to do so. These
facts are. to say the least of it,
suspicious of a purpose on his part to
conceal his identity. If, as there is
reason to suspect, his name was not
Harrison, his purpose in seeking co
entice the governor to Baltimore must
be left solely to conjecture. Every
one of the numbers of Baltimoreans to
whom I have related the story
expressed the opinion that an ulterior
purpose was at the bottom of it. Some
thought it was for the purpose of
placing the governor under absolute
secession influences and forcing him
by threats to do the bidding of those
who were determined to drag the Stats
out of the Union. 0Uiers took even a
less charitable view than that, and
believed it was the intention to
spirit him away and conceal his
whereabouts from his friends, and some
declared their belief that it was a
plot to put him out of the way. One of
the most prominent citizens of
Baltimore exclaimed, when I told him
the story, "They meant to kill him. I
believe you saved his life."
But whatever may have been the
purpose of those associated with the
man who called himself Col. Harrison,
in endeavoring to get the governor
back to Baltimore, it is certain that
he could only have gone there again,
at that time, at great risk to his
health and danger to his life at the
hands of the rioters, to whom he was
exceedingly obnoxious.
Allusion to the governor's protest
against the landing of Federal troops
at Annapolis and of his subsequent
intercourse and correspondence with
General Benjamin F. Butler, brings
forcibly to mind the construction
placed upon these acts by writers of
history and others who had no
knowledge of side events and
occurrences which would have led them
to a different conclusion. They
regarded his course then as indicative
of opposition to the prosecution of
the war for the preservation of the
Union, or, at best, of the possession
of a weak and vacillating character,
that made him ready to take the side
of the power which might exhibit the
greatest strength in the conflict then
impending between the Government and
the seceding States. Butler in his
book intimates that as his opinion and
judgment. Perhaps judgment of that
sort, based solely upon a documentary
hypothesis, without other evidence,
may be justifiable; but I have already
shown that while publicly declaring
that he would rather lose his right
arm than raise it to strike down a
sister State, he was entertaining the
most decided purpose to give his
support to the Government in its
efforts to coerce the South by
military force and preserve the Union
at all hazards; and that, throughout
the winter of I860 and 1861; he
resisted every appeal and stood like a
rock against all the influences
brought to bear to induce him to call
a special session of the legislature;
and I have personal knowledge from my
constant intercourse with him, that
the part he played in his
correspondence with General Butler, as
the latter rehearses it, in his book,
was only intended to blind the
secessionists of the State as to his
real sentiments and purposes. Butler
himself concluded that he was not a
secessionist at heart, but thought him
"only a weak and very cautious man,"
and the inference from that expression
is that he was afraid to place
Maryland in a decided attitude in the
crisis then upon the country. This
idea is almost as erroneous as the
opinion entertained by some persons
that he was really hostile to the
Government.
General Butler tells very
graphically the story of his journey
from Philadelphia to Annapolis with
the Eighth Regiment Massachusetts
Infantry, and of the rumors which met
him of the great uprising in Maryland
against Federal authority, which made
it necessary, as he supposed, for the
regiment to proceed with great caution
and with loaded arms to repel attacks
from the infuriated citizens of the
old commonwealth. He says he was told
that all Maryland had arisen as one
man to oppose his march, and, from the
extreme caution he exhibited in
approaching Perryville on the
Susquehanna river, he evidently fully
believed these rumors. He came into
Maryland from Philadelphia by the
Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore
Railroad, but, while his does not say
so, he certainly saw no signs of this
great uprising on the way nor as he
approached his objective at
Perryville. Before reaching that point
his route lay for at least twenty
miles through Cecil county and the
train bearing the regiment passed
through the populous town of Elkton,
the county seat; but he does not
assert that any evidences of hostility
were encountered at any point in the
county. In fact his troops were
entirely unmolested and saw very few
of the inhabitants, nest of whom were
undoubtedly sleeping in their beds.
Notwithstanding this fact, however,
General Butler, in anticipation of a
fight at Perryville, says he "went
through the cars, saw every man,
examined his rifle, found it in good
order, stood over him while he loaded
it and saw that it was all right." As
the regiment numbered about 1,000 men,
his inspection, if it required half a
minute for each man, must have taken
him not less than eight hours. It may
be uncharitable to suppose this
description of his action overdrawn,
but I believe that, taking it as a
basis of comparison, it may not be
unreasonable to consider some other
statements of his, which I shall
quote, "cum grano sails."
At that time there was no bridge
over the Susquehanna river by between
Perryville and Havre de Grace, and a
powerful steamer, called the Maryland,
was used by the railroad company to
transport its trains between those
points. General Butler says that
before leaving Philadelphia with his
troops, Mr. S. M. Felton, president of
the railroad company, put this steamer
at his disposal and promised to "have
her provided with coal and water if
the enemy had net taken possession of
her." To this offer Butler replied:
"But, Mr. Felton, if we capture the
Maryland it may be necessary to burn
or sink her," and he was "immediately
given an order on her officers to do
either." He assigns no reason for
apprehending such a necessity, but
from the exaggerated rumors he was
receiving of armed resistance by the
whole people of Maryland, he may have
feared that if left to ply between
Perryville and Havre de Grace she
would have been used to transport
those people to the eastern side of
the river to oppose the march of other
troops hurrying forward to the defense
of the National Capital.
"When the train bearing the troops
arrived within three-quarters of a
mile of Perryville skirmishers were
thrown out and the regiment advanced
prepared for battle. But when the
landing was reached no sign of an
enemy appeared. Only some of the
officers and crew of the Maryland were
found aboard of her, "the others
having deserted," and "all was quiet
on the Susquehanna."
Finding no signs of a hostile
demonstration at Perryville, the
troops were embarked on the Maryland
and she steamed down the river and the
Chesapeake bay toward Annapolis, where
she arrived before morning, Sunday,
April 21st. It is a curious feet that
although no hostile demonstration
whatever had been encountered by the
regiment in its passage from1
Philadelphia to Perryville, Butler
still apprehended that he would Wave
to fight at Annapolis. Hiss story of
his arrival at die "Ancient City," is
of decided interest, as showing the
cross-apprehensions of himself and the
officers at the Naval Academy. Butler
was looking for an attack from the
people of Annapolis, while the
officers of the academy were on the
lookout for an attack Iron, the
Baltimore mob, and when the Maryland
was sighted approaching the academy
wharf "the 'assembly' was beaten, men
were forming, the lights were
glancing," and a fight seemed
imminent. But to the mutual relief and
pleasure of all concerned, it was
ascertained, after a few cautious
preliminaries, that the men on the
boat and the men on the shore were
partisans of the same cause.
While General Butler's troops were
the first to arrive at Annapolis, they
were not the first to land. That honor
was reserved for the Seventh New York
Regiment commanded by Col. Lefferts.
Why that happened will be explained
further on. Col. Lefferts' regiment
landed upon the grounds of the Naval
Academy about five o'clock, Monday
afternoon, April 22nd. An incident
occurred as the boat bearing the
troops was steaming into the harbor,
that subjected the secessionists of
the city to considerable ridicule and,
at the same time, exposed the absolute
falsity of the rumors that all
Maryland was in arms to dispute the
passage of Northern troops through the
State. An ex-state officer, whose name
I will withheld and simply designate
him as Mr. Blank, stationed himself on
Main street, near the old City Hotel,
in the center of the city and, with
his face inflamed with passion, began
to call in a loud voice upon the
people to rise and repel the invaders.
Soon a large crowd gathered in the
vicinity, while he 'continued
bellowing (bellowing is the only word
that properly describes his outcries)
his anathemas against the Government
and his wrathful desire far resistance
to the troops. But his exhortations
met no response from the crowd, and
excited nothing more dangerous than
smiles of amusement upon many faces.
It was a challenge to the people to
show their colors and, while the
unionists were treating it with
ridicule, the secessionists, whatever
may have been in their hearts, made no
sign. Judge Nicholas Brewer happened
to be in the vicinity, and, hearing
the unusual noise, proceeded to
investigate its cause. Approaching
Blank he ordered him to desist from
his efforts to foment a riot and
warned him to keep the peace. The
warning was unheeded and Blank became
more strenuous and boisterous in his
appeals for volunteers to resist the
landing of the troops. The judge then
said to him: "Blank, if your are
determined to play the fool, go ahead
and take the consequences."
Judge Brewer started homeward and,
as he passed near me, I said to him:
"Judge, Blank seems to be in a bad
humor." His reply was: "Oh, damn
the Blanks, none of 'em ever would
fight, anyhow." He had rightly
concluded that Blank well knew his
appeals would be unheeded and that .he
was only playing a part to get a name
for courage and uncommon zeal for the
Southern cause. The Judge's remark was
heard by numbers of the bystanders. It
was greeted with a hearty laugh and
Blank's appeal fell so flat that it
was the death of the notion that an
uprising against the troops was
impending, if it had ever been
contemplated. Judge Brewer's remark
about the fighting qualities of the
Blanks may have been unjust, but in
less than two hours afterwards, I saw
the man who had been crying for
volunteers to fight the Yankees,
peaceably and amicably conversing,
without the least sign of passion,
with a member of the New York Seventh
Regiment in its camp on the grounds of
the Naval Academy.
General Butler, who accompanied the
Eighth Massachusetts Regiment to
Annapolis and directed its movements,
was not a regimental officer, but the
commander of the brigade which was
composed of the first five regiments
sent to the war by Massachusetts. The
other regiments were making their way
to Washington by different routes.
Col. Timothy Munroe was the commander
of the Eighth, but apparently took no
part in the events which followed its
arrival at Annapolis.
Butler was received with great
cordiality by Commodore Blake, the
commandant at the Naval Academy, with
whom he breakfasted after his arrival
at Annapolis. Commodore and Mrs. Blake
and their son, who was an officer in
the Navy, were at the table and Butler
states that he received a hint from
Mrs. Blake not to talk too freely in
the presence of her son, who, she
said, sided with secession. It was a
time indeed when a "man's foes were
those of Ms own household."
Butler decided to hold the academy
long enough to receive reinforcements
in order to prevent and neutralize all
the efforts possible to shut off
troops from Washington, and he also
concluded to hold the town, which he
says he did, and that "from that time
forth Annapolis was in the hands of
the Union side." Reinforcements for
those purposes were not needed, and I
believe a single company would have
been sufficient to have preserved
order. There were few organized
companies of militia in the State and,
I believe, but one in Anne Arundel
county, and not more than one in
Prince George's county, covering the
territory between Annapolis and
Washington, and neither was likely to
have made an effort to capture the
Naval Academy, which could have been
easily defended by the midshipmen.
An amusing story was told about the
Prince George's company, but I cannot
vouch for its truth and will only give
it for what, it may be worth. As the
story went, it was said the company
was advised that the Northern troops
were about to begin their march across
the country to Washington, and decided
to encounter and oppose them at
Governor's Bridge. The company
barricaded the bridge with hogsheads
of tobacco and then awaited the
advance of the Federals. Presently a
rider appeared, running his horse at
full speed and crying: "They're
coming. They're coming." Then the
Prince Georgians, regarding
"discretion the better part of valor,"
incontinently fled. To one of the
number who suggested the propriety of
saving the tobacco another replied:
"Oh, damn the tobacco; let us save
ourselves." I am inclined to believe
the story aprocryphal, but it has a
humorous side that makes it worth the
telling.
The first information I received of
the presence of Federal troops at the
Naval Academy was given me by Harriet,
a slave and fine old servant woman
employed in my family. She knocked at
my bedroom door soon after daybreak
and in trembling tones cried out:
"Dey's a whole boat load o" sojers
at de Naval ‘Cademy."
She was very much alarmed, but I
assured her she was in no danger of
being molested by them and she retired
to the kitchen. I was not surprised at
the information she had given me. In
conversation with Judge Brice
Goldsborough, of the Court of Appeals,
the previous evening, we had concluded
that Annapolis was the back door to
Washington and that troops would
probably come through it to the
National Capital while the way through
Baltimore was obstructed.
My assurances to Harriet had only
partially quieted her fears and she
soon returned and knocked again at my
door, which she partially opened and,
with her eyes fairly starting from
their sockets, cried: "Fo" God sir,
dey's a whole boat load o' sojers at
d'e Naval 'Cademy."
I told her then that I would go to
the Naval Academy and see about it and
that quieted her.
On my way to the academy, I
encountered John R. Magruder, mayor of
Annapolis, and James S. Franklin, an
uncle of the wife of Admiral W. S.
Schley, who was a pronounced Southern
sympathizer and afterwards, for nearly
three years, served as a captain in
the Army of General R. E. Lee. I
inquired of them whether it was true
that Federal troops had arrived at the
Naval Academy wharf, and they
confirmed Harriet's story. I expressed
the pleasure it gave me to hear it and
the hope that they would land promptly
and proceed to Washington. Mayor
Magruder was not enthusiastic about
it. He said he feared if they landed
it would invite an attack on the place
by the Baltimore mob. Mr. Franklin
said nothing.
I proceeded to the academy and,
just as I arrived at the wharf where
the Maryland, with the troops aboard
of her, and the old ship Constitution,
(Old Ironsides) were lying, Captain
Rodgers, who was in command of the
latter, came ashore and greeted me.
The Constitution had been lying at the
academy for sometime as a practice
ship and I had frequently met Captain
Rodgers at meetings of a fraternal
order, of which we were members, and
had become quite intimate with him.
This will account for the fact that,
knowing my ardent union sentiments, he
informed me, in confidence, that he
had orders to take the Constitution
around to New York. The information
was rather disconcerting, as it seemed
to indicate that the Government might
be about to abandon its purpose to
prosecute the war for the preservation
of the Union. Indeed, it was rumored
at Annapolis for a day or two that was
its purpose.
Captain Rodgers was a gallant
officer and was thoroughly imbued with
the union spirit. General Butler, in
his book, pays a compliment to his
worth, but I think was in error in
saying that he rose to the rank of
admiral. He was killed while
reconnoitering in the harbor of
Charleston, S. C., his head having
been crushed by a cannonball.
On my visit to the Naval Academy
wharf I saw none of the officers of
General Butler's command. Very few
citizens were about the wharf and
there was no undue excitement. To all
outward appearance the people were not
greatly excited by the presence of the
troops at any time during the day.
They gathered in groups and conversed
quietly, but there was nor the
slightest evidence shown of a hostile
purpose towards the troops.
Read Part Three
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