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Maryland's Part in Saving the Union

By William L. W. Seabrook, Ex-Commissioner of the Land Office

Read Part One | Part Three | Part Four

The Union victories in the First and Sixth Congressional Districts, at the special election in June, 1861, although the majorities were meagre, were of great importance by demonstrating that even in the slaveholding territory of the State the unionists were at least as numerous as the opposition. It will probably be contended by non-unionists, that the election was held at a period when military interference affected the result, but such a contention is without justification. Speaking particularly of the Sixth District, I am confident that a fairer election was never held within its borders. I assert this .from personal observation. The votes of Southern sympathizers and secessionists were nowhere challenged in the district and they were cast solidly for Benjamin G. Harris, of St. Mary's county, Mr. Calvert's opponent. Mr. Harris was a pronounced secessionist, while Mr. Calvert was as emphatic in support of the Government. To make this clear I will relate a little story of personal experience bearing upon the subject. My name had been prominently mentioned in connection with the nomination. I did not desire to be a candidate but was determined that, if it could possibly be prevented, the nomination should not be given to any aspirant who was not in full accord with the Government and in favor of prosecuting the war for the preservation of the Union. The nominating convention met at Bladensburg, but only four of the seven counties in the district were represented. These were Montgomery, Howard, Anne Arunelel and Prince George's. Calvert, Charles and St. Mary's which were strongly Southern in sympathy, sent no delegates. Each of the four counties represented placed a different name in nomination. op the first ballot Montgomery county cast three votes for Alien Bowie Davis, Howard county three for Judge Edward Hammond, Prince Georges four for Charles B. Calvert. I received the four votes of Anne Arundel county. Then the Prince George's delegates approached me and proffered me their support on the second ballot. That meant, my nomination, if I had concluded to accept it; but as I did not desire it, the proposition gave me the opportunity to confer with Mr. Calvert's supporters and to gain a clear understanding of his views and his purposes in regard to sustaining the government, if nominated and elected. I informed the delegation that I favored his nomination, provided he would come before the convention and promise that. if elected, he would vote for men and money to prosecute the war for the preservation of the Union. Before the second ballot was taken he appeared in the convention and gave an emphatic pledge to pursue that course. "I am," he said, "in favor of preserving the Union, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must, and, if elected to Congress, I will vote for measures necessary to that end: and that means for men and money to carry on the war to a successful termination." By my advice the Anne Arundel delegation voted for him on the second ballot and he was declared the nominee of the convention. He was an honorable man and fully redeemed his promise by his votes in Congress.

The unprejudiced reader will readily agree that in the slaveholding territory there was a larger proportion of prominent citizens in sympathy with the Southern cause than in other sections of the State. This was perfectly natural, as the secession movement was a slaveholders' revolt against the freesoilism of the Republican party, and most of the leading men in the locality were slave owners. This meant, of course, that victory for Mr. Calvert could only have been achieved by the rank and file of the voters, and is corroborative of the contention that a majority of the working people were in favor of the Union and of the national administration then endeavoring to preserve it by military power. Further on I will relate another circumstance in confirmation of this contention, the story being so inter­woven with other events that it would mar it to disconnect it from them.

It may seem superfluous to repeat a statement already made, but I desire to emphasize the fact that the special election in June, 1861, was as free and fair as it could have been under the most favorable conditions. Up to that time there had been no repression of the freedom of speech in Maryland, and Southern sympathizers were permitted to express their sentiments freely and without restraint. In Annapolis a body of these sympathizers, numbering 75 or 80, had banded together and nightly paraded the streets, halting at intervals and cheering for Jeff Davis and the Southern Confederacy. Their movements were such as indicated that they were being drilled as a military organization. But for sometime after the war began they were not restrained in action by the Federal authorities. On one occasion, while a company of unionists was holding a meeting in the City Hall, on Main street, for the purpose of perfecting an organization to guard the city and preserve order, this body of secessionists marched to a point on the street opposite the hall, and stood for some time shouting lustily for their Southern favorite. The unionists were with difficulty restrained by their leaders from rushing from the hall and attacking their bold opponents. The situation was becoming very tense, when finally, about the middle of the summer of 1861, the commandant of the Provost guard, whose headquarters were at the Naval Academy, notified the leaders of the secession gang that their open demonstration of hostility to the government must cease, and this put an end to the trouble. The fact is mentioned here to show the extreme leniency exercised by the military authorities toward those who made an open display of their hostility to the Union, long after the war for its preservation was in progress, and to furnish additional evidence of the perfect fairness of the election which had resulted in favor of the Union cause.

And just here let me call attention to the election of State officers in November 1861, which had a similar result throughout the State generally. Augustus W. Bradford, of Baltimore county, was the Union candidate for governor, and Samuel S. Maffit, of Cecil county, the candidate for comptroller of the treasury. Benjamin C. Howard, a Past Grand Master of the Masonic Grand Lodge of. the State, an eminent citizen and a member of the Howard family, distinguished for its services in the Revolutionary War, and later, was the secession candidate. Mr. Howard was a Southern sympathizer and opposed to the war, but not a secessionist per se. His rather conservative views, however, did not save him from an overwhelming defeat. Mr. Bradford was elected governor by an immense majority, the total vote having been as follows:

  • Bradford - 57,503
  • Howard - 26,965
  • Bradford's majority - 30,538

The border counties, Allegany, Washington, Frederick, Carroll, Baltimore, Harford and Cecil gave 14,474 of this majority. The only counties which gave majorities for Howard were Calvert, Charles, St. Mary's and Talbott, but in most of the other counties of the slaveholding section the vote was close. The number of votes polled in the counties was about equal to the number usually cast at State elections, hut for some reason which I cannot undertake to explain, the secessionists in Baltimore, in many cases, failed to vote and, while Bradford received 17,922, only 3,347 voted for Howard.

It should not be inferred from what I have said about the tendency of slaveholders to favor the Confederate cause, that all of them were of that mind. There were many notable exceptions to this rule and many true unionists among this class of citizens; men who believed that the preservation of the Union was paramount to every personal interest. There were no truer loyalists in this country and they deserve to be honored for their patriotism and their devotion to principle against what they had reason to believe was their personal interest, and the defeat of which would have resulted in the loss of their property in slaves. All of these, however, who in the earlier stages of the war had been unionists, did not remain true to the cause to the end of the struggle. They were alienated by the Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Lincoln and by an early movement in the State for the emancipation of the slaves within her borders, without compensation to loyal owners, which finally culminated in that result by the adoption of the constitution of 1864.

The effect of this was that when Mr. Calvert was a candidate for re-election in 1863, he was beaten. Benjamin G. Harris was again the opposing, and this time, the successful candidate. He was, however, the only secessionist elected to Congress from Maryland during the war, and he narrowly escaped expulsion for open expressions of sympathy for the South in its efforts to establish a separate government. Speaking in opposition to a resolution for the expulsion of Alexander Long, of the Second District of Ohio, who had expressed himself in favor of recognizing the independence of the Southern Confederacy, Mr. Harris said:

'The South ask you to leave them in peace, but now you say you will bring them into subjection. This is. not done yet, and God Almighty grant it never may be."

For this language a resolution to expel Mm from the House was introduced, but it was found that in neither his case nor that of Mr. Long, could the necessary two-thirds vote to adopt the resolution be obtained. Resolutions of censure, however, were passed and Mr. Harris was publicly reprimanded by the Speaker for his disloyal utterance. His course did not show the "bent" of Maryland, unless that of Mr. Long displayed the inclination of Ohio, as Harris's was the only disloyal exhibition in the House by a Maryland member, during the war. It is to be remarked also that as the district from which Mr. Harris was elected, lay contiguous to the District of Columbia and adjacent to the National Capital, the election of so arrant a secessionist as he, is at least prima facie evidence that his supporters were not over awed by threats of force or military interference with their right to cast the ballot.

It would be folly, as I have already said in substance, to deny that there was a wide division of sentiment among the people of the State upon the question of secession, but my contention and I believe its correctness is borne out by what I have already stated is that the friends of the Union were in a decided majority. Many other facts and incidents can and will be cited which will not only strengthen but fully demonstrate the truth of this assertion, the evidence to that effect being cumulative. Practically the people were divided into several distinct classes with varying shades of opinion as to the best course to be pursued in the emergency. These classes might be reduced to about there unconditional unionists, who favored an immediate resort to force; conservative unionists, who reprecated disunion and were opposed to secession, but hoped against hope and believed it possible to restore the Union by compromise; and those who were out and out in favor of secession and union with the new Confederacy. Strange as it may seem, some of those included in the second class claimed that by seceding Maryland would place herself in a position to act as a mediator between the Government and the seceding States and thus, by courting assurances of non-intervention with the peculiar institution of the South on one side, and reasonable concessions on the other, bring about the reunion which they fully desired. In this connection I have in mind a letter received from a friend in January, 1861, a prominent citizen of Frederick, a member of the bar and afterwards for thirty years a judge of the Circuit Court. In this letter my friend importuned me to use whatever influence I might possess with Governor Hicks to induce him to convene the legislature in extra session that it might call a convention to place Maryland in this attitude of mediation. I need hardly say that the scheme did not commend itself to my judgment and in replying to the letter I gave my friend to understand very distinctly, that I did not believe in the efficiency of his remedy to prevent the disruption of the Union. I further informed him that I was urging the governor to resist all appeals to him to call an extra session of the legislature. I feared this friend, from whom in previous years I had learned devotion to the Union, was drifting away from his moorings upon the tide of secession, and his subsequent course confirmed that apprehension.

Others of this class wanted the State to take some action without knowing exactly what it should be. They were, figuratively speaking, at sea, and drifting, without definite knowledge of their whereabouts. But in the early days of the secession movement they joined the pronounced secessionists, like my optimistic Frederick friend, in importuning the governor to call an extra session of the legislature. Like him, also, they became, in the end, out and out secessionists and bitterly hostile to the government during the war. From them and from the open secessionists, who were not very numerous, the governor received innumerable letters and direct personal appeals urging him to call the legislature together. But most of the real conservative unionists became decided supporters of the government in its efforts to suppress the rebellion after all compromise projects had failed. It is possible that if the governor had yielded to the importunities of the secessionists and their conservative union allies in their demands for an extra session of the legislature, an ordinance of secession would have been adopted, but that it would have been by less than a real majority of the voters of the State. I am convinced that at no time could such an ordinance have received a clear majority of the entire voting population of the State. The danger lay, in that case, in the active aid the secessionists would have received from the Confederacy, and in the probability that coercion by force would have been employed to deter the unionists from asserting their rights at the polls. The temper of those who were intent on "joining the new Confederacy" was of a character to have made such action more than possible, if the opportunity had been given them. Occasionally threats were made that unless the governor gave them the opportunity to ally Maryland with the South they would take the matter into their own hands, call a convention by proclamation and vote the State out of the Union. An eminent Maryland lawyer had once declared that it was possible for the people of the commonwealth lo assemble in mass and change the constitution, and that such action, carried into successful effect, would be valid. But Governor Hicks was not alarmed by such threats. He did not believe the malcontents would carry their efforts to the extent of making such an attempt, and was confident that if it were made it would result in failure. He continued his inaction through the winter, though at times leading the secessionists to believe that he was considering their demands and might in due time concede them. It has been charged that he was really vacillating in that respect, but. I know that any word of his that gave color to the charge was spoken for the purpose of quieting the unrest that <was being manifested by the Southern sympathizers, and of rendering action toward the secession of the State impossible until it should have become too late to have made such an effort successful. The late Severn Teackle Wallis, one of the most eminent lawyers and pronounced secessionists in the State, accused the governor with duplicity. Mr. Wallis, who was a leading member of the Baltimore bar, used this word in its most offensive sense, in which it was, in my judgment, very unjust. It would be about as fair to charge the commander of an army with duplicity for making a military movement for the purpose of deceiving his enemy as to his real intentions. Governor Hicks doubtless felt and expressed sympathy for the South in a limited sense. He was a slaveholder, was born and reared and had lived all his life in the atmosphere of slavery. He would, at the time Mr. Wallis made the charge against him, have been bitterly opposed to interference on the part of the government with that institution where it existed. He did not pretend to be in sympathy with abolition. There was no doubleness about him in that respect. If the secessionists were deceived by his utterances against such interference into believing that he was only waiting ,a favorable moment to join them in carrying the State out of the Union, they simply jumped at a conclusion of which the "wish was father to the thought." Governor Hicks was, it must be acknowledged, artful and diplomatic in political affairs, but not double-minded or unstable. Those who were brought into intimate relations with him knew that he never disclosed his plans and purposes to a political enemy. Many stories are told of this characteristic of his mind, as it was exhibited in his political career in his own county, which he represented in the State Senate as a Whig, many years before the Civil War, and in which he was never defeated: for office, though frequently a candidate. But it is not my purpose to relate any of these stories here, and they are only alluded to give emphasis to the real meaning of the object I have attributed to 'him in his dealing with the secessionists. He wished to avoid an open outbreak and a conflict that might have plunged the State into a civil war on its own account. Any independent movement of the secessionists to have allied the State with the new Confederacy would have been resisted by the unionists and bloodshed would undoubtedly have followed.

The antagonistic relations between unionists and secessionists grew very bitter as the time for a change of the National Administration approached, and individual broils between them were not infrequent. The secessionists, too, beginning to realize that they had been duped by the governor, grew very bitter against him and denounced him in unmeasured terms.

Wrangles between citizens of opposing sentiments occurred occasionally, until about midsummer of 1861, but by that time the people had learned that quarrels were to no profit and that it was better policy to live peaceably together than to be engaged in wordy strife. It is ,probably a remarkable fact that from that time throughout the war there was little personal animosity among citizens of Annapolis growing out of the conflict. As its fortunes varied there was rejoicing or sorrow according to the success or defeat of the side preferred, but taunts of the defeated were rarely indulged in. Of course there were exceptions to this rule, but they were neither numerous nor excessively offensive.

But to return to the consideration of the course and character of Governor Hicks. It is to be said that he was not an ordinary man and cannot be fairly judged by an ordinary man's standard. He was humbly born and a man of the people, though descended from an excellent family. He had only the education afforded by the inefficient public schools of his early youth; but he rose to distinction and performed services for his state and country of value far exceeding the appreciation they have yet received.

The urgency with which the secessionists made their pleas for a, special session of the legislature would have been embarrassing to the governor if they had not been met with as decided opposition from the unionists, though I believe he would in any case have withstood all efforts to induce such action. He would have found some excuse for postponing a call and for baffling them. But he was not without the moral support of a large number of prominent citizens in every section of the State, in delaying action. Many of them by letter and others in person exhorted him to stand firm against the purposes of those who were seeking to dragoon the State into joining the Southern Confederacy.

It was a significant circumstance and strongly corroborative of the testimony I am able to bear to his loyalty, that .he sought the counsel and advice, almost daily, of a few of the most pronounced unionists in Annapolis', but only conferred with secessionists when they requested it. William H. Purnell, comptroller of the treasury, and I, having been elected on the ticket with him in 1857, were regarded by him as in some measure members of his official family, and as both were unconditional unionists he kept us informed of the movements of the opposition and consulted with us concerning the best means of dealing with and thwarting their efforts to bring about the secession of the State. Others with whom he most frequently conferred were Hon. Alexander Randall, an ex-member of Congress and one of the most consistent and ardent unionists in the State; Judge Nicholas Brewer, who was, if that were possible, a more radical unionist than the former, and Judge Brice W. Goldsborough, of the Court of Appeals, grandfather of the present governor Phillips L. Goldsborough. By the information gained from the governor, embodied especially in the vast number of letters received by him, pro and con, of the secession movement, we were enabled to gauge the drift of public sentiment which, I can affirm confidently, was more favorable to the Union than to the Southern cause.

Governor Hicks' course in dealing with Judge Handy, who was sent to Annapolis as a commissioner from the State of Mississippi, in the latter part of January, 1861, to induce the governor to take such action as would place Maryland in line with her sister States in the South, furnished one of the strongest proofs of his unqualified unionism. Judge Handy was a native of Somerset county, Md., and an old acquaintance of the governor. He was a refined and pleasant gentleman and well fitted for the purpose of his mission, and it is probable that his presence at Annapolis caused the State Executive more embarrassment than any other of the many methods pursued by the secessionists to win him to their cause and induce him to turn the State over to the action of the legislature. Judge Handy would not rest content with indefinite promises, contingent upon uncertain occurrences, and daily during the several weeks of his presence in Annapolis, continued to urge prompt action. The governor played his non-committal game, as skillfully as possible, while Judge Handy fairly haunted the executive chamber and, as time passed, redoubled his importunities. At last, with patience exhausted, he demanded an explicit answer to a categorical question:

"Governor, do you intend to call the legislature in extra session?"

Driven to the wall, the governor, no longer able to temporize with the Mississippi Commissioner, replied, in substance, "No; at least not at present, and perhaps not at all."

Then Judge Handy rose in wrath and exclaimed: "Well, sir, we will show you that cotton is king."

I was not present at this interview, but was promptly informed of its purport and told of the governor's tart reply to Judge Handy's exclamation. I hesitate to repeat it, as it was more expressive than polite, but for the truth of history here it is:

 "Well, sir, you and your king can go to hell together, we are not going with you."

Governor Hicks' abhorrence of secession had overcome his natural inclination and lifelong habit of treating all men with civility, and his reply must have been a revelation to the commissioner. It practically took the governor into the open and brought down upon him the anathemas of the secessionists, while Judge Handy returned to his home in Mississippi, convinced that the Confederacy need not look to the executive of Maryland for assistance in its efforts to embrace the entire South in its government.

The mission of Judge Handy to Annapolis had been, without doubt, a cause of encouragement to those who were importuning the governor to call an extra session of the legislature, but though discouraged by its failure they did not abandon their efforts to bring about that result. They knew that the executives of Maryland and Virginia were in correspondence and it was generally understood that an agreement existed between them to act in concert. No doubt this was partially correct, and the fact encouraged the secessionists to believe that both States would adopt measures to join them to the Confederacy. But Hicks' understanding of his co-operation with Governor Lecher, of Virginia, was that they were to act in the interest of the Union. He assured me at least, that was his purpose in carrying on the correspondence. Governor Lecher was professing attachment to the Union cause and Governor Hicks was fully convinced of his sincerity and his loyalty. His confidence may have been misplaced, but the Governor of Virginia must be credited with having had, up to a certain period, a sincere desire to prevent the secession of that State, and be probably hoped and believed, that, with Maryland's cooperation, some basis of compromise between the government and the seceding States might be agreed upon and the latter restored to their fealty to the Union. That is not entirely conjecture. It was the tone of the correspondence and of Governor Hicks's understanding of the matter.

But eventually Governor Lecher yielded to the pressure brought to bear upon him by the secessionists of Virginia and the South. The legislature of the State was convened, passed a bill calling a convention, provided for au election of delegates and then submitted the State to the action of the electors. That Virginia was not prepared for secession even then, was shown by the result of the election. The unionists were successful in electing a majority of the delegates and there remained a prospect that the convention might refuse to submit an ordinance of secession to a vote of the people. But in the progress of events enough, unionists were won over to secure the passage of the ordinance. Numbers of the delegates in favor of the Union remained firm and resolute to the end, but were treated with contempt and obloquy, especially by the women of Richmond. One of these Union delegates informed me that he and others, who had voted against the ordinance, were so at upon by prominent ladies of the city, as they passed out of the State House after casting their votes against secession. The secession of the State inevitably followed. A majority of the votes cast at the election was in favor of the ordinance, but it is still open to doubt to say the least of it, whether a majority of the people of the old commonwealth would have voted that way if the election had been full, free and fair. The military power of the Confederacy was practically in control when the election was hold: the unionists were overawed and the union sentiment stifled. Even if the contrary be admitted, I know there was never a moment when Maryland's governor was willing that she should follow Virginia into secession, notwithstanding there were times when his words and his deeds seemed to justify a different opinion, or to indicate that he was, at least, opposed to the employment of force to prevent the success of the secession movement. And it is but truth to say that the employment of the military power of the government for the preservation of the Union was regarded by Governor Hicks as the last resort and only justified when all efforts at conciliation had failed. And that was the general sentiment of the unionists of Maryland, as well as of many friends of the Union in the Northern States. When all other reasonable means to prevent the disruption of the nation had been tried and failed, the governor was as decidedly in favor of prosecuting the war as was Lincoln himself.

But to return again to the consideration of the acts on his part which then gave color to the charge that he was of doubtful loyalty, and which are still believed by many to have been prompted by a sneaking sympathy with the cause of the Southern Confederacy.

The Old Executive Manson (No Longer Standing) & The State House 1861

Of these acts there stand out prominently a speech which he delivered in Monument Square, Baltimore, on the night of April 19, 1861, after the attack of the mob on the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment; his protest to General Benjamin F. Butler against landing troops from another State at the United States Naval Academy, and his proclamation convening the legislature in extra session at Frederick, far away from the State Capital. All these acts were crowded into three or four days, on and immediately succeeding the date of the uprising of the mob in Baltimore the memorable 19th of April, 1861, against the passage of Northern troops through that city and it’s attack on the Massachusetts men on their march over Pratt street.

The governor was in Baltimore when the riot began and, at the earnest solicitation of friends and ni3mbers of the city government, remained until the following morning. It is charged that at a conference of city officials and prominent private citizens with him he either gave orders to have the bridges on the P. W. and B. Railroad burned, or gave his assent to that act, which was one of the incidents connected with the effort to obstruct the passage of Northern troops through Maryland to the national Capital. This he always strenuously denied. He was under duress at the time and his life was endangered. A lawless mob had followed him on the street threatening violence and crying ''Hang him, Hang him." It is probable that, under the circumstances, he may have said something that was construed as an assent to the destruction of the bridges, but he always contended that he had used no language that could have been justly thus construed. In his speech in Monument Square ha did, however, declare that lie would "rather lose his right arm than raise it to strike down a sister State." It will be seen that this language is somewhat ambiguous, but was, at the tune, construed as against the employment .of force by the National Government to defeat secession.

The governor returned to Annapolis the fallowing morning, but the report of his speech had preceded him. It depressed the unionists and elated the secessionists, who felt that at last he was on their side in the great controversy. He went from the train, by which he arrived, to the State House alone and it was my good fortune to meat him on the steps at the front entrance. I do not remember certainly whether this was by accident or design on my part. I was anxious to see him and believe that, in anticipation of his arrival, was on my way to the executive chamber. As we met be extended his hand and greeted me with his usual cordiality. But I was in no mood for the ordinary civilities and at once, after shaking hands with him, impulsively exclaimed:

"Well, Governor, you have deserted us at last." The exclamation was really meant as an interrogatory, and his reply was a question."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean that it is reported that you made a secession speech in Monument Square last night."

"That is not true," he replied. "I did say some things that under other circumstances I would have left unsaid. The city was in the grip of the rioters with whom the authorities seemed unable to cope and the mob spirit was rampant. My life was threatened and I felt it was in great danger. I believed that in order to preserve it, it was necessary to simulate sentiments which I dad not and do not entertain." Then suddenly changing his tone and manner to great earnestness, he said:

"See here, I want you to know and to be thoroughly convinced that I am with you and will not desert you. The Union must be preserved, and under no circumstances will I abandon the cause. Whatever shall occur you can count on my standing by you."

I repeat this conversation from memory and may not give the exact language used by the governor, but what tie said was quite as emphatic and differed from it but little as I have quoted it. His whole manner was indicative of the most perfect sincerity and his words lifted a great load from my heart. I had feared that he had been swept from his moorings and was at last launched on the tide of secession, or at least had given up hope that the state could be kept from joining in the secession movement; and to learn from his own lips, with all the emphasis that he could put into the words', that my apprehensions were unfounded, was a most cheering assurance.

And here let me remind the reader that this assurance was given at the time when, under the impulse of the mob spirit, there seemed danger that the State might be carried out of the Union in a whirlwind of excitement. The mob of Southern sympathizers was in supreme control in Baltimore, ,or at least seemed to be so, and every secessionist in the State was taking heart and looking for speedy action in the interest of the Southern cause. But the governor, in this interview with me, did not hesitate to assert his continued and unchangeable fidelity to the Union. There was no hint of disloyalty in manner or speech then; yet within thirty hours thereafter he protested to Gen. Butler against the lauding of Federal troops at Annapolis.

Before proceeding to consider that protest, the correspondence with General Butler that followed it and the latter's story of his arrival in Maryland, with his comments on his reception by the governor and the mayor of Annapolis, which I wish to do at some length, I desire to relate an incident which, I believe, gave me the opportunity to perform a service of great value to the State and country. That service was the prevention of the governor's return to Baltimore on the day succeeding the attack by the mob on the Massachusetts troops.

After his interview with me, which I have described, he went to the executive chamber for a short time and then to the governor's mansion for a much needed rest. It did not occur to me that he would be exposed to any danger there, but about noon, Mr. Purnell, the comptroller of the treasury, with whom I was in constant co-operation in our relations with the governor, suggested that he should not be left alone. That it was a time of great peril and that he should be guarded against the possibility of danger. Rumors were in circulation that the Baltimore mob was preparing to descend upon the United States Naval Academy, and as the executive mansion was located on grounds abutting on the harbor, just outside of the academy walls, it was not certain that the governor's person was not in danger. As Mr. Purnell was busy with his official duties I adopted his suggestion and acted upon it. I went to the executive mansion soon after midday and spent the afternoon with the governor. It has always been a source of gratification to me that I (M so, as my presence prevented his return to Baltimore, where his life would have been in great peril.

I had been with him but a short time when a visitor was announced and was shown into the room where we were sitting. He was a tall, spare man of middle age, sharp-featured and alert in his movements. He promptly introduced himself as Col Harrison, and without further preliminary said:

"Governor, I have come down with a special train to take you back to Baltimore. You are needed there. The city is in the hands of the mob and the authorities are unable to cope with the rioters. It is felt. that your presence there will inspire the law-abiding citizens with confidence, as by your authority they can be organized and officered and so be placed in a position to quell the riot," It was a strong appeal to the governor's sense of duty, and there is no manner of doubt that, but for my presence, he would have yielded and accompanied Col. Harrison back to Baltimore.

I realized the impropriety and danger of such a step and promptly advised against it. I reminded the governor that he was not then fully recovered from the effects of a surgical operation; that his health was by no means robust; that he had been under a great strain the previous day and night and that he might imperil his life by a repetition of that experience. I did not allude to the danger he might encounter from the mob, nor suggest that others than the rioters might be interested in his vacating the gubernatorial office to give place to an avowed secessionist in the person of John B. Brooke, the president of the State Senate. I feared that any suggestion of that character might prompt him to brave the danger involved in his return to the city. I urged the importance of his life to the Union cause,

and the disastrous consequences which would befall the cause by a change in the executive office at that time. He made no attempt to conceal from Col. Harrison his devotion to the Union and his sympathy with the Federal Government in its purpose and efforts to enforce the national laws and re-posses the forts and other property of the United States that had been seized by the Confederacy. He did not personally know Col. Harrison and, of course, was ignorant of his sentiments on the subject, but did not attempt to .conceal his own loyalty.

Col. Harrison was furious at my interference with Ms plans and we had some hot words over the matter, but I succeeded in dissuading the governor from going back to Baltimore with him. I remained at the executive mansion until informed that Col. Harrison had left Annapolis with his special train.

It is an ominous circumstance that I have never been able to find a prominent citizen of Baltimore who knew this Col. Harrison. There was a Col. Harrison in Baltimore at the time, but he was an elderly man and a prominent official of the Canton Company, and I knew him personally. There is no positive proof that the governor's visitor cams to Annapolis under an assumed name; but during his interview he carefully refrained from the expression of any political sentiment, or of sympathy with the friends of the Union; did not mention the name of a single individual of those who had sent him on his mission, and left no address at which he could have been communicated with if the governor had desired to do so. These facts are. to say the least of it, suspicious of a purpose on his part to conceal his identity. If, as there is reason to suspect, his name was not Harrison, his purpose in seeking co entice the governor to Baltimore must be left solely to conjecture. Every one of the numbers of Baltimoreans to whom I have related the story expressed the opinion that an ulterior purpose was at the bottom of it. Some thought it was for the purpose of placing the governor under absolute secession influences and forcing him by threats to do the bidding of those who were determined to drag the Stats out of the Union. 0Uiers took even a less charitable view than that, and believed it was the intention to spirit him away and conceal his whereabouts from his friends, and some declared their belief that it was a plot to put him out of the way. One of the most prominent citizens of Baltimore exclaimed, when I told him the story, "They meant to kill him. I believe you saved his life."

But whatever may have been the purpose of those associated with the man who called himself Col. Harrison, in endeavoring to get the governor back to Baltimore, it is certain that he could only have gone there again, at that time, at great risk to his health and danger to his life at the hands of the rioters, to whom he was exceedingly obnoxious.

Allusion to the governor's protest against the landing of Federal troops at Annapolis and of his subsequent intercourse and correspondence with General Benjamin F. Butler, brings forcibly to mind the construction placed upon these acts by writers of history and others who had no knowledge of side events and occurrences which would have led them to a different conclusion. They regarded his course then as indicative of opposition to the prosecution of the war for the preservation of the Union, or, at best, of the possession of a weak and vacillating character, that made him ready to take the side of the power which might exhibit the greatest strength in the conflict then impending between the Government and the seceding States. Butler in his book intimates that as his opinion and judgment. Perhaps judgment of that sort, based solely upon a documentary hypothesis, without other evidence, may be justifiable; but I have already shown that while publicly declaring that he would rather lose his right arm than raise it to strike down a sister State, he was entertaining the most decided purpose to give his support to the Government in its efforts to coerce the South by military force and preserve the Union at all hazards; and that, throughout the winter of I860 and 1861; he resisted every appeal and stood like a rock against all the influences brought to bear to induce him to call a special session of the legislature; and I have personal knowledge from my constant intercourse with him, that the part he played in his correspondence with General Butler, as the latter rehearses it, in his book, was only intended to blind the secessionists of the State as to his real sentiments and purposes. Butler himself concluded that he was not a secessionist at heart, but thought him "only a weak and very cautious man," and the inference from that expression is that he was afraid to place Maryland in a decided attitude in the crisis then upon the country. This idea is almost as erroneous as the opinion entertained by some persons that he was really hostile to the Government.

General Butler tells very graphically the story of his journey from Philadelphia to Annapolis with the Eighth Regiment Massachusetts Infantry, and of the rumors which met him of the great uprising in Maryland against Federal authority, which made it necessary, as he supposed, for the regiment to proceed with great caution and with loaded arms to repel attacks from the infuriated citizens of the old commonwealth. He says he was told that all Maryland had arisen as one man to oppose his march, and, from the extreme caution he exhibited in approaching Perryville on the Susquehanna river, he evidently fully believed these rumors. He came into Maryland from Philadelphia by the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad, but, while his does not say so, he certainly saw no signs of this great uprising on the way nor as he approached his objective at Perryville. Before reaching that point his route lay for at least twenty miles through Cecil county and the train bearing the regiment passed through the populous town of Elkton, the county seat; but he does not assert that any evidences of hostility were encountered at any point in the county. In fact his troops were entirely unmolested and saw very few of the inhabitants, nest of whom were undoubtedly sleeping in their beds. Notwithstanding this fact, however, General Butler, in anticipation of a fight at Perryville, says he "went through the cars, saw every man, examined his rifle, found it in good order, stood over him while he loaded it and saw that it was all right." As the regiment numbered about 1,000 men, his inspection, if it required half a minute for each man, must have taken him not less than eight hours. It may be uncharitable to suppose this description of his action overdrawn, but I believe that, taking it as a basis of comparison, it may not be unreasonable to consider some other statements of his, which I shall quote, "cum grano sails."

At that time there was no bridge over the Susquehanna river by between Perryville and Havre de Grace, and a powerful steamer, called the Maryland, was used by the railroad company to transport its trains between those points. General Butler says that before leaving Philadelphia with his troops, Mr. S. M. Felton, president of the railroad company, put this steamer at his disposal and promised to "have her provided with coal and water if the enemy had net taken possession of her." To this offer Butler replied: "But, Mr. Felton, if we capture the Maryland it may be necessary to burn or sink her," and he was "immediately given an order on her officers to do either." He assigns no reason for apprehending such a necessity, but from the exaggerated rumors he was receiving of armed resistance by the whole people of Maryland, he may have feared that if left to ply between Perryville and Havre de Grace she would have been used to transport those people to the eastern side of the river to oppose the march of other troops hurrying forward to the defense of the National Capital.

"When the train bearing the troops arrived within three-quarters of a mile of Perryville skirmishers were thrown out and the regiment advanced prepared for battle. But when the landing was reached no sign of an enemy appeared. Only some of the officers and crew of the Maryland were found aboard of her, "the others having deserted," and "all was quiet on the Susquehanna."

Finding no signs of a hostile demonstration at Perryville, the troops were embarked on the Maryland and she steamed down the river and the Chesapeake bay toward Annapolis, where she arrived before morning, Sunday, April 21st. It is a curious feet that although no hostile demonstration whatever had been encountered by the regiment in its passage from1 Philadelphia to Perryville, Butler still apprehended that he would Wave to fight at Annapolis. Hiss story of his arrival at die "Ancient City," is of decided interest, as showing the cross-apprehensions of himself and the officers at the Naval Academy. Butler was looking for an attack from the people of Annapolis, while the officers of the academy were on the lookout for an attack Iron, the Baltimore mob, and when the Maryland was sighted approaching the academy wharf "the 'assembly' was beaten, men were forming, the lights were glancing," and a fight seemed imminent. But to the mutual relief and pleasure of all concerned, it was ascertained, after a few cautious preliminaries, that the men on the boat and the men on the shore were partisans of the same cause.

While General Butler's troops were the first to arrive at Annapolis, they were not the first to land. That honor was reserved for the Seventh New York Regiment commanded by Col. Lefferts. Why that happened will be explained further on. Col. Lefferts' regiment landed upon the grounds of the Naval Academy about five o'clock, Monday afternoon, April 22nd. An incident occurred as the boat bearing the troops was steaming into the harbor, that subjected the secessionists of the city to considerable ridicule and, at the same time, exposed the absolute falsity of the rumors that all Maryland was in arms to dispute the passage of Northern troops through the State. An ex-state officer, whose name I will withheld and simply designate him as Mr. Blank, stationed himself on Main street, near the old City Hotel, in the center of the city and, with his face inflamed with passion, began to call in a loud voice upon the people to rise and repel the invaders. Soon a large crowd gathered in the vicinity, while he 'continued bellowing (bellowing is the only word that properly describes his outcries) his anathemas against the Government and his wrathful desire far resistance to the troops. But his exhortations met no response from the crowd, and excited nothing more dangerous than smiles of amusement upon many faces. It was a challenge to the people to show their colors and, while the unionists were treating it with ridicule, the secessionists, whatever may have been in their hearts, made no sign. Judge Nicholas Brewer happened to be in the vicinity, and, hearing the unusual noise, proceeded to investigate its cause. Approaching Blank he ordered him to desist from his efforts to foment a riot and warned him to keep the peace. The warning was unheeded and Blank became more strenuous and boisterous in his appeals for volunteers to resist the landing of the troops. The judge then said to him: "Blank, if your are determined to play the fool, go ahead and take the consequences."

Judge Brewer started homeward and, as he passed near me, I said to him: "Judge, Blank seems to be in a bad humor." His reply was: "Oh, damn the Blanks, none of 'em ever would fight, anyhow." He had rightly concluded that Blank well knew his appeals would be unheeded and that .he was only playing a part to get a name for courage and uncommon zeal for the Southern cause. The Judge's remark was heard by numbers of the bystanders. It was greeted with a hearty laugh and Blank's appeal fell so flat that it was the death of the notion that an uprising against the troops was impending, if it had ever been contemplated. Judge Brewer's remark about the fighting qualities of the Blanks may have been unjust, but in less than two hours afterwards, I saw the man who had been crying for volunteers to fight the Yankees, peaceably and amicably conversing, without the least sign of passion, with a member of the New York Seventh Regiment in its camp on the grounds of the Naval Academy.

General Butler, who accompanied the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment to Annapolis and directed its movements, was not a regimental officer, but the commander of the brigade which was composed of the first five regiments sent to the war by Massachusetts. The other regiments were making their way to Washington by different routes. Col. Timothy Munroe was the commander of the Eighth, but apparently took no part in the events which followed its arrival at Annapolis.

Butler was received with great cordiality by Commodore Blake, the commandant at the Naval Academy, with whom he breakfasted after his arrival at Annapolis. Commodore and Mrs. Blake and their son, who was an officer in the Navy, were at the table and Butler states that he received a hint from Mrs. Blake not to talk too freely in the presence of her son, who, she said, sided with secession. It was a time indeed when a "man's foes were those of Ms own household."

Butler decided to hold the academy long enough to receive reinforcements in order to prevent and neutralize all the efforts possible to shut off troops from Washington, and he also concluded to hold the town, which he says he did, and that "from that time forth Annapolis was in the hands of the Union side." Reinforcements for those purposes were not needed, and I believe a single company would have been sufficient to have preserved order. There were few organized companies of militia in the State and, I believe, but one in Anne Arundel county, and not more than one in Prince George's county, covering the territory between Annapolis and Washington, and neither was likely to have made an effort to capture the Naval Academy, which could have been easily defended by the midshipmen.

An amusing story was told about the Prince George's company, but I cannot vouch for its truth and will only give it for what, it may be worth. As the story went, it was said the company was advised that the Northern troops were about to begin their march across the country to Washington, and decided to encounter and oppose them at Governor's Bridge. The company barricaded the bridge with hogsheads of tobacco and then awaited the advance of the Federals. Presently a rider appeared, running his horse at full speed and crying: "They're coming. They're coming." Then the Prince Georgians, regarding "discretion the better part of valor," incontinently fled. To one of the number who suggested the propriety of saving the tobacco another replied: "Oh, damn the tobacco; let us save ourselves." I am inclined to believe the story aprocryphal, but it has a humorous side that makes it worth the telling.

The first information I received of the presence of Federal troops at the Naval Academy was given me by Harriet, a slave and fine old servant woman employed in my family. She knocked at my bedroom door soon after daybreak and in trembling tones cried out:

"Dey's a whole boat load o" sojers at de Naval ‘Cademy."

She was very much alarmed, but I assured her she was in no danger of being molested by them and she retired to the kitchen. I was not surprised at the information she had given me. In conversation with Judge Brice Goldsborough, of the Court of Appeals, the previous evening, we had concluded that Annapolis was the back door to Washington and that troops would probably come through it to the National Capital while the way through Baltimore was obstructed.

My assurances to Harriet had only partially quieted her fears and she soon returned and knocked again at my door, which she partially opened and, with her eyes fairly starting from their sockets, cried: "Fo" God sir, dey's a whole boat load o' sojers at d'e Naval 'Cademy."

I told her then that I would go to the Naval Academy and see about it and that quieted her.

On my way to the academy, I encountered John R. Magruder, mayor of Annapolis, and James S. Franklin, an uncle of the wife of Admiral W. S. Schley, who was a pronounced Southern sympathizer and afterwards, for nearly three years, served as a captain in the Army of General R. E. Lee. I inquired of them whether it was true that Federal troops had arrived at the Naval Academy wharf, and they confirmed Harriet's story. I expressed the pleasure it gave me to hear it and the hope that they would land promptly and proceed to Washington. Mayor Magruder was not enthusiastic about it. He said he feared if they landed it would invite an attack on the place by the Baltimore mob. Mr. Franklin said nothing.

I proceeded to the academy and, just as I arrived at the wharf where the Maryland, with the troops aboard of her, and the old ship Constitution, (Old Ironsides) were lying, Captain Rodgers, who was in command of the latter, came ashore and greeted me. The Constitution had been lying at the academy for sometime as a practice ship and I had frequently met Captain Rodgers at meetings of a fraternal order, of which we were members, and had become quite intimate with him. This will account for the fact that, knowing my ardent union sentiments, he informed me, in confidence, that he had orders to take the Constitution around to New York. The information was rather disconcerting, as it seemed to indicate that the Government might be about to abandon its purpose to prosecute the war for the preservation of the Union. Indeed, it was rumored at Annapolis for a day or two that was its purpose.

Captain Rodgers was a gallant officer and was thoroughly imbued with the union spirit. General Butler, in his book, pays a compliment to his worth, but I think was in error in saying that he rose to the rank of admiral. He was killed while reconnoitering in the harbor of Charleston, S. C., his head having been crushed by a cannonball.

On my visit to the Naval Academy wharf I saw none of the officers of General Butler's command. Very few citizens were about the wharf and there was no undue excitement. To all outward appearance the people were not greatly excited by the presence of the troops at any time during the day. They gathered in groups and conversed quietly, but there was nor the slightest evidence shown of a hostile purpose towards the troops.

Read Part Three

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